As a public service,

THE LAUCKS FOUNDATION

from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Mailing No. 56.

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Words of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was executed by the Nazis, written a few months before he was arrested (As quoted by Yehezkel Landau in Christianity and Crisis, December 12, 1983, p. 475):

"For most people, the compulsory abandonment of planning for the future means that they are forced back into living just for the moment, irresponsibly, frivolously, or resignedly; some few dream longingly of better times to come, and try to forget the present.

"We find both these courses equally impossible, and there remains for us only the very narrow way, often extremely difficult to find, of living every day as if it were our last, and yet living in faith and responsibility as though there were to be a great future: 'Houses and fields and vineyards shall again be bought in this land.' proclaims Jeremiah (32:15), in paradoxical contrast to his prophecies of woe, just before the destruction of the Holy City. It is a sign from God and a pledge of a fresh start and a great future, just when all seems black.

"Thinking and acting for the sake of the coming generation, but being ready to go any day without fear or anxiety—that, in practice, is the spirit in which we are forced to live. It is not easy to be brave and keep that spirit alive, but it is imperative."

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William Raspberry THE GUARDIAN, June 19, 1983

Lowering Our Sights

I DON'T know what it means or what its long-term implications might be. I only know that something profoundly serious is going on (even if hardly anyone is commenting on it) and that it will almost certainly change the character of the nation.

I have in mind the lowering of expectation. For perhaps the first time in the history of America, parents do not expect their children to be better off economically than they themselves are.

There are exceptions, of course. The school teachers whose children are in medical school or law school still expect the family fortunes to improve. The government worker whose son or daughter is pursuing a master's in business administration at a first-rate school may be thinking in upbeat terms. Low-income parents, including recent immigrants, may be hopeful with regard to their children's future.

But talk to middle-class professionals, and what you get is a near-universal sense that their children will be hard-pressed to maintain the standard of living into which they were born. Our still-at-home children may already be living in the biggest house, wearing the best clothes, enjoying the most affluent lifestyle they ever will.

Parents whose notion of natural progression involved moving from the college dorm into a one-bedroom apartment, then into a two-bedroom apartment, then to a small cottage and finally to the big house on the hill, are recognizing that, for their children, the big house on the hill may be out of the question.

Indeed, the rather modest single-family home may not be possible without two incomes and substantial help from the parents.

Part of the lowering of expectations is the result of a lowering of need, the abandonment of the hard-times-induced notion that more is better. Part of it is the result of the discovery that big homes, big cars and big bank accounts have little to do with happiness.

But the major part, I suspect, has less to do with a changing sense of values than with a changing economy.

The adult chilren who come home to live with Mom and Dad do so not because they reject the idea of economic independence but because they have tried it out there and discovered that they can't hack it. As a result, parents who in other times might have pushed their children out of the nest, for fear of spoiling them, are preserving a corner of that nest against the time when their children might need it.

Nor is there much reason to suppose that this situation will soon change. The technology of computers and robotics will make our work easier, but it will also make a lot of workers unnecessary. The optimistic view is that lowering of economic ambition and the decreased need for labor will give our children time to pursue other, more humanizing, values.

But it is also a fact that our economy, at least until now, has been consumption-driven. The quintessential American notion that bigger is better and that more is a moral imperative may have had its philosophical shortcomings, but it also made the economy work.

What are the social, ethical and economic implications of lowered expectations? Will our less-ambitious children be able to take care of us in our old age? What will we substitute for materialism as an engine to drive the American economy?

While it seems obvious that the answers will profoundly influence our future as a nation, we have not yet got around to considering the questions.

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PEACE AND PROTEST

THERE is a natural polarity in human efforts to alter or improve the world we live in. One pole is represented by the claim that it is necessary, first, to change the circumstances which surround us, in order to permit the decencies and natural excellences of people to have play and come to the surface. The other pole has expression in the view that we must begin by changing ourselves. Once this is accomplished, it is said, the external arrangements will very nearly take care of themselves, in spontaneous reaction to the altered nature of those for whom they exist and of whom they become a social extension.

Then there are those who, using common sense, say we have to do both. Difficult questions, however, remain. For one thing, it is easier to focus attention on bad or painful circumstances. Our environment, both natural and man-made, is continually producing events which seem to call for immediate action. When the river rises we need to get out there and shore up the levees. When a government remains indifferent to conditions and relationships which lead to the starvation of thousands of children, who can deny the force of the argument that the government should be replaced, the children fed? That such conditions now exist in many parts of the world is well known; and that cruelly oppressive circumstances are endemic in a number of countries is continuously made plain by the reports of Amnesty International. Worst of all, perhaps, is the threat of war, both nuclear and "conventional," which seems to worsen from day to day, with only brief interludes of lessened pressure. If governments are left to themselves, current historians point out, they are sure to engulf the world in self-destruction; governments, it is shown, are little more than powerful instruments of corporate self-interest, immune to moral considerations, and at the same time skilled in the use of partisan propaganda. Nation-states of today are virtually all "terrorists," since their acts and intentions are responsible for much of the fear abroad in the world.

What can we do?

Weighing proposed answers to this question is the content of a new book by Bob Overy, a British pacifist who has been active in the peace movements of the past twenty-five years. His title is *How Effective Are the Peace Movements?*, the publisher, Harvest House, Ltd. (2335 Sherbrooke Street, West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3H 1G6). Basing his analysis on the practice of pacifists of various persuasions, the author divides his subject into three sections, giving attention to Movements to Eliminate War, Movements to Stop Particular Aspects of War, and Movements to Stop Particular Wars. His discussion makes a very good book, of interest to all who want to contribute in some way to putting an end to war.

Speaking of the movement for non-violent revolution, along the lines of Richard Gregg's *The Power of Non-violence* (1935), Overy says:

> The peacemaking of non-violent revolution starts with oneself. In this it is not much different from varieties of pacifism which stress the importance of individual conduct—"Let there be peace on earth, let it begin with me." But where pacifism emphasizes "peace" as a value for the individual, non-violent revolution is harsher, placing more stress on "equality," "freedom" and "liberation," and the necessity for conflict if change is to happen. War isn't so much the only or central problem as that it reflects all structures of oppression. In a view close to the Tolstoyan, non-violent revolutionists examine how their own lives fit into the surrounding system of inequality and unfreedom: then they try to break out of patterns which reinforce that system and to build alternatives. . . .
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> Fundamental then to this type of politics is the ordering of one's own life, that life being the only means of making revolution which one can legitimately control. Non-violent revolutionists have begun to combine in all sorts of collective living and work arrangements as part of their effort to build non-oppressive organizations in an "alternative society." The idea of securing political or social power within the exsting society in order to do good—as with capturing power through political parties or "getting to the top of your profession"—is scorned. But the problem that new institutions in an alternative society will inevitably constitute new forms of social and political power is a constant source of ambiguity and dispute. Particular efforts are being made to develop ways of organizing and coordinating groups which do not require hierarchical leadership; but the scale of such experiments is limited at present. . . . It is a revolutionary theory which is gradualist; it highlights the build-up of revolution as a process based on the quality of life as it is lived now, rather than as some decisive or explosive event which will come some time in the future. In this respect it is a pragmatic process based on the quality of life as it is lived now, rather than geared to constantly postponed expectations of transformations to come; it is a pragmatism which tries to promote pockets of idealism.

The moral issue here lies in the Tolstoyan distinction

between the two aspects of the life of every human—the side of his freedom, in which he acts according to his own perception of right and wrong, and his "elemental swarm life in which he inevitably obeys laws laid down for him." The free man rejects the habits of the swarm when it goes against his conscience, and the same issue of decision may arise when he endeavors to act in concert with others. Interpreting Tolstoy (in *The Discovery of Peace,* Pantheon, 1973), Ronald Sampson writes:

> Confusion arises, he says, when we wrongly transfer the notion of freedom which we rightly associate with self-regarding actions (actions of conscience) to those acts which we perform in conjunction with others and which depend not simply on our own mind and conscience but upon the contingency of other wills coinciding with our own. And the great paradox which lies at the heart of *War and Peace* is that the supreme example of man's unfreedom, that is to say, of his being bound by the chains linking his activities to those of others, is when a man enjoys what we term *power* over the lives of other men. Men seek power in order to impose their will on others, to do that which they want to do and which they want others to do, which, being in a less powerful position they fear they would not be able to do. But, insists Tolstoy, a man is free in proportion to his non-possession of power. And the most powerful are the most unfree. "The strongest, most indissoluble, most burdensome, and constant bond with other men, is what is called power over others, which in its real meaning is only the greatest dependence on them."
>
> The significance of this principle for the understanding of history is momentous. For conventional historians regard power not at all in the sense of Tolstoy's paradox but in the way that the vast mass of mankind understand it. History is made by men of power, so historians write of the activities of statesmen, generals, kings and diplomatists, men who are visibly possessed of power. Tolstoy does not quarrel with this at the level of actuality—he does not dispute its *descriptive* truth. But he relegates it to the despised status of the unpredetermined, swarm-life of mankind, the life of enslaved men, living lives not free and thus not worthy of men.

There is an obvious question: Is there no part of the "swarm-life" that is tolerable for a person of conscience? Isn't it possible to be in it but not of it? Bob Overy speaks to this point:

> At present non-violent revolution leaves out on a limb "non-violent revolutionists" like myself who are not part of a "revolutionary subculture" but remain in conventional settings where we live and work. Our values differ from those of our fellows at numerous points, yet if we make links and try to play an influential part at work or in the local community we become vulnerable to the criticism that we are "liberals" getting sucked into the dominant institutions. Non-violent revolution does not yet have a clear notion of what action is "progressive," that is, "going in the right direction," and what is not; it lacks an adequate theory of how to work on the "inside" and "at the margins" of the institutions it criticizes; it lacks charity (and political sensitivity) toward those who for various reasons can go with it only part of the way. Moreover, for individuals spending years of their lives in nuclear families, in suburban neighborhoods, in conventional jobs, it seems especially pretentious and even a little absurd to call themselves "non-violent revolutionaries"—and so they tend to fall back on marginally safer labels like "radical pacifist," "alternative socialist" or "non-violent anarchist"; that is, these individuals accept psychologically that they are part of an active permanent minority, rather than of a potential revolutionary movement.

Why, it may be wondered, should these distinctions and labels matter so much, or at all? They may matter a great deal to those who are endeavoring to give their movement objective definition, including standards to live up to. Could there even *be* a movement without such distinctions and definitions? How can we judge ourselves and one another if we don't distinguish between the right and the wrong relations with the existing society?

Yet this "absolutism" in classification overlooks the fact that in every age of transition, a great many people, while they are thinking things over, are bound to have one foot in the past and the other in the future, especially since there is always room for debate about at least some aspects of both camps. The reason why there is no clear notion of what action is "progressive" and "going in the right direction" is that decision is at first always a subjective consideration. Involved is a gradual restructuring of one's value system; and at the same time, for some, there remains a natural reticence to being labeled or classified as being on either the "right" or the "wrong" side. Identification of what is wrong with the existing society is easy enough, but defining what will be good or better may prove exceedingly difficult, especially since, as history shows, the righteous and progressive political movement almost invariably, upon gaining power, becomes an establishment which resists further change. On the other hand, movements do embody the spirit, the courage, and persistence that lead to change.

This is the paradox or contradiction discussed with understanding by Bob Overy. Apparently, we need to have movements, yet the danger of externalizing their moral principles, and the conversion of those principles into shallow slogans, is ever present—a tendency that is likely to shut out the best of humans. Some remarks by Abraham Maslow concerning his self-actualizing subjects (in *Toward a Psychology of Being*), drawn from an early paper, have application here.

> I recall my healthy subjects to be superficially accepting of conventions, but privately to be casual, perfunctory and detached about them. That is, they could take them or leave them. In practically all of them, I found a rather calm, good-humored rejection of the stupidities and imperfections of the culture with greater or lesser effort at improving it. They definitely showed an ability to fight it vigorously when they thought it necessary. To quote from this paper: "The mixture of varying proportions of affection or approval, and hostility and criticism indicated that they select from American culture what is good in it by their lights and reject what they think bad in it. In a word, they weigh it, and judge it (by their own inner criteria) and then make their own decisions."

Movements, then, we might say, arise when the signs of a condition needing remedy become so painfully evident—as for example the threat and frequency of war—that the "inner criteria" can be generalized as the stance and overt program of change. The danger, of course, is that those "inner criteria" will then be relegated to second place, with behavioral definitions of righteousness taking their place. When this occurs, the moral vision and intensity of the movement is thinned, and while the simplicities of its appeal may attract "followers," its actual strength

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(Continued)

is diminished by the lowered quality of thinking among them. In the process, self-righteousness becomes a noticeable feature in its undertakings. This, again, shuts out the more perceptive and reflective members of society. Movements, we might say, are necessary but not sufficient. Without the grounding in almost undefinable attitudes of mind, they become mere shells. Yet movements sometimes show that they *have* this grounding, and win widespread support from individuals of exceptional character.

Maslow's further remarks about self-actualizers are one indication of the grounding:

> They also showed a surprising amount of detachment from people in general and a strong liking for privacy, even a need for it.
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> "For these and other reasons they may be called autonomous, i.e., ruled by the laws of their own character rather than by the rules of society (insofar as they are different). It is in this sense that they are not only or merely Americans but also members at large of the human species. I then hypothesized that "these people should have less 'national character,' and that they should be more like each other across cultural lines than they are like the less-developed members of their own culture."
>
> The point I wish to stress here is the detachment, the independence, the self-governing character of these people, the tendency to look within for the guiding values and rules to live by.

It hardly seems necessary to say that the people Maslow is describing will never be a cause of war.

In one place Bob Overy speaks of the "reactive" efforts of peace movements, calling them "despairing responses to the fact that our social and political systems are controlled by people who are incapable of giving us peace." He adds: "Occasionally we erupt in protest against the latest illustration of this sad truth, but we never manage to get to the root of the problem and succeed in constructing a social and political system which will give us peace." The reason may be that there are not enough self-actualizers to go around. Which is a way of suggesting that the human race is still in the early stages of its *moral* evolution.

Yet far from being discouraged, Overy points out that the anti-Vietnam war struggle in the United States did put an end to that war, and he is convinced that "the lifeblood and the trigger of the popular American movement against the Vietnam war was the courageous individual civil disobedience of peace movement activists." His own recommendations in relation to the British opposition to nuclear weapons installations suggest a change from the *mass* actions of the past:

> My feeling is that a strong case can be made for a different direct action strategy this time against nuclear weapons. There is no question that a *willingness to sacrifice oneself* is fundamental to this type of action. But to concentrate all this idealistic commitment for a few national set-piece actions which challenge the state at its most strongly defended points seems foolhardy. I would advocate a strategy which does not concentrate support *nationally* but tries to develop it locally; which looks not to *mass* action, but as far as possible to *small-group* or *individual* action. Moreover, the action should be to minimize the risk to the movement by focusing on subsidiary issues where the vital interests of the state are not so directly affected and a victory may be more easily won. Ideally, too, the action should be *defensive* rather than *aggressive,* and the range of direct actions taken should not be *narrowly political* but should reflect a broad social movement, involving a transformation in the daily lives of the activists.

This calls for an example, and we have one which may not suit Bob Overy very well—it was a demonstration against nuclear power, although the relation between power and weapons has been shown to be quite close—yet it gives opportunity to reflect on the meaning and limitations of overt protest. We quote from a chapter in Wendell Berry's *The Gift of Good Land* (Northpoint Press, 1981):

> On June 3, 1979 I took part in an act of nonviolent civil disobedience at the site of a nuclear power plant being built at Marble Hill, near Madison, Indiana. At about noon that day, eighty-nine of us crossed a wire fence onto the power company's land, were arrested, and duly charged with criminal trespass.
>
> As crimes go, ours was tame almost to the point of boredom. We acted under a well-understood commitment to do no violence and damage no property. The Jefferson County sheriff knew well in advance and pretty exactly what we planned to do. Our trespass was peaceable and orderly. We were politely arrested by the sheriff and his deputies, who acted, as far as I saw, with exemplary kindness. And this nearly eventless event ended in anticlimax: the prosecutor chose to press charges against only one of the eight-nine who were arrested, and that one was never brought to trial.
>
> And yet, for all its tameness, it was not a lighthearted event. Few of us, I think, found it easy to decide to break the law of the land. For me it was difficult for another reason as well: I do not like public protests or crowd actions of any kind; I dislike and distrust the slogans and the jargon that invariably stick like bubble gum to any kind of "movement."

He gives his reasons, which are several. Already there were over sixty power plants in the Ohio River Valley, either working, planned, or under construction. "Air pollution from existing coal-fired plants in the valley is already said to be the worst in the country." The people have nothing to say about the erection of these plants, and are expected to sacrifice their health—among other things—"to underwrite the fantasy of 'unlimited economic growth'." In addition, some power companies had decided that nuclear power is the answer to the "energy problem."

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Two such plants were under construction in that part of the Ohio River Valley, the inhabitants "being taxed to promote an energy policy that many of them consider objectionable and dangerous." Further, while the plant planned for Marble Hill would be in Indiana, it would obviously have an effect on Kentucky, where Berry lives. "The people of one state thus become subject to a decision made in an another state, in which they are without representation. And so in the behavior of big technology and corporate power, we can recognize again an exploitive colonialism similar to that of George III."

Berry also gives his reasons for opposing *nuclear* power, based upon facts reported in the newspaper, and confirmed by the accident at Three Mile Island. So he climbed the fence at Marble Hill, "casting a vote that I had been given no better opportunity to cast." Then he says:

> But even though I took part wholeheartedly in the June 3 protest, I am far from believing that such public acts are equal to their purpose, or that they ever will be. They are necessary, but they are not enough, and they subject the minds of their participants to certain dangers.

One of these dangers is simplification of issues; another, self-righteousness. "In the midst of the hard work and the risks of opposing what 'we' see as a public danger, it is easy to assume that if only 'they' were as clear-eyed, alert, virtuous, and brave as 'we' are, our problems would soon be solved." This is a patently false notion. He is talking about nuclear power plants not the prospects of nuclear war, yet elements of parallel remain. Many people know the truth of what Berry says, yet let it be obscured in the rush of action. The following applies to protests of all kinds:

> The roots of the problems are private or personal, and the roots of the solutions will be private or personal too. Public protests are incomplete actions; they speak to the problem, not to the solution.
>
> Protests are incomplete, I think, because they are by definition negative. You cannot protest *for* anything. The positive thing that protest is supposed to do is "raise consciousness,"
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> but it can raise consciousness only to the level of protest. So far as protest itself is concerned, the raised consciousness is on its own. It appears to be possible to "raise" your consciousness without changing it—and so to keep protesting forever.

Yet protesting may be right and necessary. "As a father, a neighbor, and a citizen, I had begun to look on the risk of going to jail as trivial in comparison to the risks of living so near a nuclear power plant." The prospect of war—any sort of war—may make many other considerations seem trivial. What some people are doing about the threat of war, their different ways of doing it, and the attempt to measure their "effectiveness," is the subject of Bob Overy's book, making it a good one for the general reader. No one can escape the "effectiveness" of modern war.

(Reprinted by permission of the Manchester Guardian Weekly)

Violence swills back over the talk of peace

THE GUARDIAN, November 13, 1983

THAT a conference about peace and reconciliation in Lebanon should be capped by new violence on the ground is unsurprising. We have grown weary of such ironies. Fighting and talking have long been part of the same continuum in the Middle East.

We should not be confused by the double talk. The Geneva conference, whatever the intentions of the Americans, has not been about "national reconciliation". The attack on Arafat's last positions in Tripoli is nothing to do with his alleged "betrayal of the Palestinian nation". The Israeli air attacks which followed the bombing of a headquarters building in Tyre were not aimed at "Palestinian terrorist bases". And the bomb in Tyre, like the bomb that killed the US marines and the one that blasted the US embassy, has almost certainly nothing to do with the "Islamic Jihad Organisation".

The reality is that Syria and Israel, even more than before, are the forces creating both diplomatic and military events — and everything else that others want, whether they be smaller actors in the region, like the Lebanese factions, or a superpower, like America, is sucked into the pattern set by Damascus and Tel Aviv.

Syria is pursuing two related objectives, both of which it sees as stepping stones to a third. The first is to inflict a double defeat on Israel and in Lebanon, by junking the still unratified Israeli-Lebanese treaty, forcing a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the south, and then, while withdrawing its own forces, enjoying predominant influence in a remodelled Lebanon. The second is to destroy the last remnants of an independent PLO under Arafat, thus completely capturing the Palestinian movement.

The third and more general objective is to go into that final showdown with Israel and the United States, whenever it comes, with a good chance of success. For that, the Russian connection is not enough, nor its real, though limited, military capacity. Effective control over the Lebanon, and an ability to deliver the Palestinians in any general settlement are thus assets which Damascus, feeling that it has taken on the whole burden of opposing Israel since the Egyptian defection, is determined to have. That is why the Lebanese reconciliation conference has sent President Gemayel off, not to look at methods of achieving a fairer balance between the communities in his country, but to explore new ways of getting the Israelis out of the south. That is probably why a young Palestinian or Lebanese Shi'ite drove to his death at dawn last Friday in order to take a couple of dozen Israeli soldiers with him. And that is why Syrian guns were raking the suburbs of Tripoli at the weekend.

The Israelis, confused and harassed and increasingly conscious of how completely they failed in Lebanon, are not in one of their confident phases. They did set in motion a chain of events which has all but destroyed the old PLO, and they did set the Maronites back on top of the shaky Lebanese pyramid. But now they watch as Syria prepares to reap the benefits of Israel's war, and seem not to know how or when to respond.

The United States, in spite of the hostages to fortune it has given in the shape of its troops in Lebanon, seems unwilling to face up to the new situation in the Middle East. Announcing his new Middle Eastern envoy last week, President Reagan spoke of his plan of September 1982, as still the "best chance" for peace. That plan envisaged Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank "in association" with Jordan. But the assumptions upon which this plan was based have eroded. There is no longer an independent PLO which can talk to Hussein, even if he were ready to talk; and Jewish settlement in the West Bank, as everybody knows, proceeds apace. Now Syria cannot be an afterthought for US diplomats, to be chivvied to the table after others have laid down the main lines of agreement. Syria is now the main protagonist on the Arab side, and that means that, at the very least, both the West Bank and the Golan have to be on that table. It also means, almost certainly, that the Soviet Union has to come in at an early stage if there is to be any chance of success. And, finally it means that the US has to envisage bringing far more pressure on Israel than in previous peace plans. One has only to lay out these requirements to see how difficult it would be for a US government and particularly a Reagan administration, to meet them. But now that American as well as Arab lives are on the line, one can only hope that Washington will begin to think again.

"Nuclear missiles, with their sleek phallic forms, are, I believe, the ultimate symbol of male intelligence divorced from religious impulse and feminine cherishing. Psychologically, missiles are the engines of rape."

—Peter Abbs
(University of Sussex)

(Quoted from "Teachers, Ethical Imagination, and World Disarmament" TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD, Vo. 84, No. 1, Fall 1982, p.178)

THE GUARDIAN, June 26, 1983 (Reprinted by permission of the Manchester Guardian Weekly)

Andropov's plan for Fortress Russia

Jonathan Steele predicts a new Soviet emphasis on domestic affairs

MR ANDROPOV has now won the triple crown. First, party leader, then chairman of the defence council, and now — after a unanimous vote of the Supreme Soviet — he has become the head of state. In the words of Konstantin Chernenko, the man who nominated him, the decision to let him hold more than one post was proof of the "indivisibility of the prestige of the party and the state".

His promotion was expected. The surprise was not that he became President now, but that he did not become it last year after Mr Brezhnev died. That inevitably fuelled speculation that he was not yet secure in the saddle. Had he failed to take the job now the speculation would have redoubled.

The real issue for Mr Andropov over the last few months has not been the question of his own personal position. That has not been seriously challenged. It has been more insidious and depressing than that. He faces a vast coalition of mediocrity and obstructionism at all levels of the party, people who are suspicious of reform and feel threatened by it, and who can mobilise resistance to the changes Mr Andropov would like to bring in. Working up through the ranks they have managed to create a deadlock even at the Politburo level, making it hard for the party leader to bring fresh blood into the top decision-making body.

If he thought, as some politicians might be tempted to do, that he could escape from the logjam of domestic politics by involving himself in the more fruitful and exciting reaches of foreign affairs, he would be disappointed. The international environment facing the Soviet Union in 1983 is grim. For almost 15 years East-West relations have not been as bad as they are today. The United States and the three major powers of Western Europe are led by far more anti-Soviet politicians that their predecessors while the word "detente" has slipped out of the international vocabulary. Later this year Nato will deploy a new generation of land-based medium-range missiles in Western Europe which will significantly alter the threat which Moscow faces.

In spite of vague talk of summitry emanating spasmodically from Washington, there is little doubt that the Kremlin has written off any prospect of an arms control deal with the United States. The Kremlin is determined to do whatever it can to prevent the re-election of President Reagan. Unless it was sure that an arms control made with him would stick (and that means that it must be ratified by the US Senate, unlike Jimmy Carter's SALT Two), it would not tolerate a deal that could simply be used as an election gimmick.

The admission by the US Secretary of State, Mr Shultz last week that chances of an agreement with Moscow are minimal was soundly based.

Moscow also seems to have written off any hopes that public opinion in Western Europe would reverse the West German and British Government's determination to deploy the new missiles. Western doves are wrong if they think that Moscow is seriously looking for a compromise. Western hawks are wrong if they think that once deployment begins Moscow will suddenly make concessions at the end of this year or early next.

The thrust of all the Kremlin's recent statements is that Moscow will never accept any linkage between its SS-20s and Nato's Cruise and Pershing IIs. It would rather sit the Geneva talks out, waiting only to ensure that blame for their collapse is pinned on the United States, not on themselves. Meanwhile, it will prepare to deploy new missiles of its own, not necessarily because it believes it has to have them, but rather in order to show that its threats to deploy are not seen to have been empty. The only chance of a negotiated reduction of Cruise, Pershing-II, and SS-20s will have to wait for a new round of talks that brings medium-range and strategic weapons into the same bargaining forum, i.e. a merger of the two sets of negotiations now underway in Geneva.

Faced with this bleak environment, Mr Andropov is showing signs of switching Soviet foreign policy towards a kind of isolationism, a Fortress Russia policy. He told the central committee this week that the country must try to reach "the greatest possible self-sufficient" in food production. He no longer wants the Soviet Union to be at the mercy of Western Grain embargoes. In the same speech he told the Soviet Union's allies in the Third World that they must help themselves. Reflecting the Kremlin's disappointment with the experience of recent years, he said "We see the difficulties of their revolutionary development. It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's goal and quite another thing to build it . . . We render help to the extent of our possibilities but in the main their economic development, just as the entire social progress of these countries, can be of course only the work of their peoples."

The one ray of hope in the gloomy world beyond the Soviet Union's borders may perhaps be found in the rest of the socialist world, including, of course, China. Mr Andropov made a genuine-sounding plea for "friendship with all socialist countries" and coupled it with a kind of apology for Moscow's arrogance in the past. The last 20 years had shown that there were "big differences between individual countries as regards their economies, culture, and ways and methods of solving the tasks of socialist development". This was only natural, he went on, "even if it seemed to us at one time that it would be more uniform".

If this analysis is correct, Mr Andropov was signalling in his speech last week that the central agenda of his time in office will have to be domestic issues. Neither a stand-pat conservative like Mr Brezhnev nor a stop-go reformer like Mr Khrushchev he sounds more like an impatient moderniser. He told the central committee that there had to be a major shake-up in the party structure. Loyalty to party ideology was not enough. Nor should officials submerge themselves in propagandistic rhetoric, which did not convince ordinary people. Officials had to be "respected and educated," and get down to "real, practical tasks".

As for managers, he urged the party to work out a system of incentives which would encourage risk-taking. Too often at the moment the innovator "turns out to be the loser while the one who keeps away from innovation loses nothing".

That, in a nutshell, is Mr Andropov's problem. He is not of course a liberal, but he is not a conservative either. He wants the party to reform itself. The trouble is that he is 69 years old. His drive for reform does not have the vigour and eagerness of a young man. It sounds rather more like the table-pounding impatience of an elderly man who has lived in the shadow of incompetence and inefficiency for years and now that his chance to take over has come at last finds himself running out of time. Many of his colleagues in the Politburo are not sympathetic. Further down the ranks he faces resistance. And even with goodwill the system is devilish hard to change. He is President Andropov today, but the obituary on his rule may well end by being "Yuri the Frustrated".

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The defence of N.Z.

The 1983 Defence Review is a comprehensive and, on the whole, a sensible document. New Zealand last had a Defence Review in 1978 and it seems reasonable that every five years or so the Ministry of Defence should cast its eyes over the world and say where the defence interests of New Zealand lie and how they can best be managed. Internal assessments are carried out constantly; but letting the public know, at least once every five years, what the Government's thinking is on defence is a minimum gesture to give background to the year-by-year apportion of funds to defence, to general public understanding of how defence considerations fit into foreign policy, and to enable informed public discussion. Although most of the Defence Review will have been prepared within the Ministry of Defence, it is a Government White Paper and the comments it makes have to be acceptable to the Government of the day.

The Defence Review repeatedly emphasises costs. The Government is clearly sensitive to criticism that defence costs are high. New Zealand's defence costs, measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product, are about 2 per cent. This is low by world standards, very low when compared with the proportionate spending by some countries, and miniscule when compared with that of a few which take a wholly independent line in defence. Given that this country attempts to maintain some sort of defence system, the review gives the impression that it maintains the system as cheaply as possible or, as many might say, as cheaply as it dares. Some would add that the policy is either irresponsibly mean or too reliant on others, and that another price is paid for dependence on other countries.

The analysis of changes in the world strategic situtation offered in the Defence Review is generally reasonable. The 1978 Defence Review looked out on a brighter world. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea have both occurred since the last review. The increase in Soviet naval activity in the North Pacific is noted. These developments are open to various interpretations and fundamental questions can be asked. One is: does the invasion of Afghanisatan demonstrate that the Soviet Union is an aggressive power or one that is opportunist? Or: is Vietnam occupying Kampuchea as a proxy for the Soviet Union? In attempting to determine the intentions of the Soviet Union, these questions are important. The Defence Review is misleading when it describes the heavy traffic of Soviet vessels and aircraft into the North Pacific and then observes that Soviet combat ships and submarines have also been detected, though less frequently, in the South Pacific and Tasman. Strictly speaking, this is accurate. It is doubtful whether as many as five substantiated sightings of Soviet combat ships have been made in the South Pacific. The implied comparison with Soviet activity around Japan is misleading.

The 1978 Defence Review put much emphasis on New Zealand's immediate region. The 1983 Defence Review is more specific and the concept of forward defence — the idea of protecting New Zealand as far away from New Zealand's shores as possible — appears to be laid to rest. The Defence Review argues correctly that Australia and New Zealand form one strategic entity. This is particularly true from New Zealand's point of view because New Zealand must be vulnerable if Australia were in the hands of a hostile power. Australia's wider interests are seen to lie in South-East Asia and in the Indian Ocean. The New Zealand focus is seen to be on the South Pacific while retaining particular interests in South-East Asia.

One argument for having a defence force, and a force of the particular kind suggested in the document, is that, although a large-scale world war may be unlikely, there have been a number of incidents of low-level conflict. The Defence Review advocates that New Zealand should have forces capable of dealing with such low-level threats, as well as playing a role elsewhere. This is the rationale behind the proposal for a Ready Reaction Force. In fact, the Ready Reaction Force idea appeared in the 1978 Defence Review and the battalion at Singapore had been designated for this role.

This was an old arrangement. If the general commanding the New Zealand Army was instructed to take immediate action somewhere, the force at his command might be some 5000 kilometres or so away. This arrangement may have matched circumstances some years ago. The idea of having a Ready Reaction Force stationed in New Zealand makes much more sense today. The force is envisaged as having three possible uses. One would be for the direct defence of New Zealand and of the area within its Exclusive Economic Zone; the second would be within the South Pacific area where New Zealand has statutory responsibility for some islands in the Pacific; and the third use would be for another, probably distant, task such as internationally arranged peace-keeping.

The role for the Army makes more immediate sense than the suggestion that New Zealand should acquire submarines. No decision on this has been taken. The Defence Review says: "One of the compelling arguments in favour of submarines is that they are expected to be cheaper and more cost-effective than frigates." The idea that New Zealand might have submarines that could watch for poaching fishing boats may have merit. Submarines might also be able to conduct acoustic surveillance of other submarines. Yet the justification for having submarines would have to be greater than this.

Tentative as the thinking on submarines may be at present, submarines may be favoured by the balancing of economy of purchase, less demands on manpower, and the greater security of such vessels when the Navy can have but a handful of ships.

The debate about submarines, and the study of whether they will serve New Zealand's defence interests, will continue for some years. One of the most immediate points raised by the Defence Review is that: "New Zealand faces a potentially serious problem of block obsolescence of existing military equipment." This refers to the fact that, by the mid-1990s, the frigates will have exhausted their useful life and the Skyhawk aircraft will not be of much use. When frigates cost perhaps $300 million and strike aircraft $20 million each at today's prices, the cost of replacement on the same scale will be serious. The Defence Review at least provides a framework in which the defence needs of New Zealand can be considered.

The following is an excerpt from Psychological Life—From Science to Metaphor (University of Texas Press, 1982), by Robert D. Romanyshyn, as quoted by MANAS, p.3, January 4, 1984:

Before going to work one morning I stopped to have a cup of coffee in a small restaurant and to read a brief article. The article was by Hannah Arendt, a summary of her book, *Thinking*. I remember that I was struck by her thought, particularly by her observations about evil. She had written *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, and what had impressed her about this man was the great disparity between the monstrosity of the crimes and the doer of those deeds. This man, Eichmann, was not maliciously cunning. Nor was he stupidly ignorant. On the contrary, he was simply thoughtless and it was this figure of thoughtlessness who haunted the beginning of her article.

I began to think about thoughtfulness, and under the influence of Arendt's work I saw how thoughtlessness is the condition of modern humanity. We are an educated society. We are knowledgeable about many things and are taught many facts and taught how to think. But we are thoughtless and particularly thoughtless about what we have been taught and told.

It was time to leave. As I approached the door, an old man and his wife were about to enter the restaurant. He reached the door before I did, and he opened it for his wife. I stepped aside to let her enter, and as she passed me she smiled and said, "Thank you." I nodded my head in acknowledgement, and then an extraordinary thing happened. I had intended to let the old man enter after his wife and before I exited, but the old man waited at the door and held it open for me. He smiled, and with a broad, sweeping gesture of his arm he ushered me through the door.

An ordinary event which was however extraordinary because this gesture of courtesy was performed so thoughtfully. Only two words had been spoken and the entire incident lasted less than ten seconds, but in that time and space a world of manners, style, and grace had briefly appeared. This wave of an arm by an old man waiting at an open door was not an empty, formal ritual. Enacted with an eloquence and a carefulness which seemed for a moment to have come from an older world, his gesture gave visible expression to what I had been thinking about before my exit. That gesture threw the world of today into relief, and figured against that gesture the present world seemed poorer in many ways. Such thoughtful gestures of courtesy seemed to be absent today, or very rare, and I thought for a moment that perhaps this is why our world is in danger today. It is not for want of the great things. It is for want of such simple gestures performed with heart.

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