As a public service,

THE LAUCKS FOUNDATION

from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 87.

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"When humanity holds in its hand the weapon with which it can commit suicide, I believe that to put more power into the gun is to increase the probability of disaster."

—Albert Einstein

(Quoted from "Only Then Shall We Find Courage" New York Times Magazine, June 23, 1946. As reprinted in the Selected Resources publication of Beyond War.)

(Reprinted from NUCLEUS, Union of Concerned Scientists, 26 Church Street, Cambridge, MA. 02238 Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1987)

Viewpoint

The events of late 1986 produced sharply mixed omens for progress on arms control in the new year. Optimists could note that at Reykjavik the superpowers came tantalizingly close to a historic agreement; radical cuts in nuclear weapons that only recently would have been considered utopian are now on the bargaining table. But the aftermath of the summit, and the Iranian fiasco that soon followed, exposed an American foreign policy process in shambles, beginning at the top. As a result, pessimists could fairly question whether the Reagan administration is organizationally capable of articulating and carrying out a coherent arms control policy.

In assessing the Reykjavik meeting, one was simultaneously exhilarated by the thought of the deal-that-almost-was and appalled by the thought of the President, on the spur of the moment, entering a high-stakes negotiation for which he and his team were totally unprepared. In the post-summit confusion about what had and had not been agreed, it became painfully clear that the President did not fully understand the implications of the proposals he was discussing with Gorbachev.

The arms-to-Iran debacle only reinforced the picture of a President in over his head on critical foreign policy issues, and ill-served by his own policy process. Indeed, the Iranian episode displayed many of the distinguishing marks of administration policy on arms control and especially the Strategic Defense Initiative.

First, in each case a major initiative was undertaken almost entirely outside the established channels of decision-making, without benefit of the expert advice that would have immediately exposed the plan as misguided and foolhardy. Second, in each case the attempt to justify the plan reduced administration policy to an exercise in public relations, while producing a scramble among rival factions to protect their own bureaucratic and personal stakes without regard for the coherence or integrity of US foreign policy.

Third, and most disquieting, is the prominence of a contempt for legality and reliance on disinformation by the administration. The subversion of legal processes evident in the sale of arms to Iran (and the running of guns to the Nicaraguan contras) echoes the administration's specious "reinterpretation" of the ABM Treaty to allow the testing of SDI weapons.

There is reason to hope that the new Congress will be less indulgent of the administration's ineptitude and deceit, and will press harder for serious arms control. But in the final analysis the promise of Reykjavik can be realized only if the President puts his own house in order.

NewOptions

Mark Satin, *Editor*

October 27, 1986 Issue No. Thirty-two

"Independent Initiatives": Better than Arms Control?

We could see it coming. When we suggested, on the eve of the Reykjavik summit, that arms control negotiations are a "dead end" and the peace movement desperately needs to invent "qualitatively different approaches" to peace (NEW OPTIONS #31), we knew we'd get a raft of angry letters and phone calls from traditional peace activists. And we did. One phone call, from the editor of a peace publication, began, "How dare you —." Many of the letters made the point that arms control negotiations are our only hope.

But are they? Reykjavik was less than reassuring, and in fact, once you look beyond the Washington offices of the major peace groups, skepticism about the arms control process runs deep. There's a growing network of institutions and independent researchers and activists that is starting to say, Let's not struggle to repair and reconstruct the arms control process—let's design and implement a whole new peace process.

Who are these people, and why are they saying such things? You've already been introduced to some of them. They include people at the Exploratory Project on the Conditions of Peace ("Expro"—see NEW OPTIONS #20); people at Ark Communications Institute (#15); people at the Independent Commission on World Security Alternatives (#26); people at the World Policy Institute (#5).

This month we asked two of the most visible author-activists among them—Mark Sommer and Gordon Feller—to write an article for NEW OPTIONS explaining and defending their point of view. Sommer, 41, is co-founder of Expro and author of a survey of emerging peace strategies, *Beyond the Bomb* (NEW OPTIONS #26); Feller, 27, is senior associate at Ark and author of a forthcoming survey of new directions in the peace movement, *Taking the Next Steps*.

We believe their article is an exceptional short statement of the beyond-arms-control position. In deft, thoughtful strokes, it criticizes the arms control process, then goes on to suggest that an alternative to that process—what the authors call an "independent initiatives" process—is spontaneously emerging right now. Not far beneath the surface of their thoughtful prose, you can hear the authors crying out to the peace movement to pay less attention to the received wisdom ("arms control is the only important game in town") and more attention to what peace workers are actually doing.

In this respect their article reminds us of nothing so much as Carl Oglesby's speeches and writings in 1968, the year Eugene McCarthy was asking political activists to "Come Clean for Gene." Oglesby, a former president of SDS, tried over and over again to tell us that we could not rely on the traditional political strategies to create a good society. He implored us to pay more attention to our own process, *and to take ourselves seriously*. If we did, he said, we would discover that a new and more viable strategy—neither compromised nor self-destructive—was already arising among us.

We did not listen, we did not know how; perhaps we'll listen now.

By Mark Sommer and Gordon Feller

We believe very strongly that, despite what were often the sincerest of first intentions, arms control has not only failed to control the arms race but has legitimated and even institutionalized it.

Proposed in the first instance as a brake on a pair of recklessly driven vehicles, arms control has become, in the hands of its drivers, a steering wheel veering toward the cliff's edge. Most of what it has succeeded in curtailing have been those obsolescent weapons already deemed least useful and those technologies too expensive or unpromising to merit further development.

Arms control as practiced today is at best a distraction from real security, at worst a rationale for sustaining the arms race—an obstacle placed before those who would challenge the war system.

Amid the debris of the Reykjavik summit collapse (and the frustration of the perpetually deadlocked Geneva talks), it is all too evident that government-sponsored arms control does not possess the momentum to take us beyond the arms race. It is time to admit the failure of a process in which many of us have invested much faith and hope over the years, and to urge the invention of an alternative process which might better serve the ends for which arms control was first designed.

Why arms control fails

In order to design a more productive process, we must first understand why arms control as we know it has yielded so few lasting accomplishments.

From the beginning the process has been controlled by the very interests it was ostensibly designed to control. The sole players at the table have been the political elites of the two superpowers. All other interested parties—all the most likely victims of a great power "exchange"—have been left on the far side of firmly closed doors.

Though Soviet and American elites find little to agree upon among substantive issues, they have nearly always found themselves in accord in their mutual distaste for restraints on their freedom to develop and deploy new and more lethal weaponry. Each has offered only those proposals it knows the other can't accept. And if one is unexpectedly accepted, the offer is summarily withdrawn.

This paradoxical behavior is not as strange as it might seem. Though arms control is represented by superpower spokesmen and understood by the general public to be a means of ending the arms race, the negotiators themselves view it as a means of managing a conflict most don't expect ever to resolve.

"Managing" means, in this instance, making the existing system of competing military blocs safer, cheaper, and more efficient—eliminating obsolete or infeasible technologies and rerouting funds to those systems most →

likely to yield a relative advantage in future negotiations or conflicts. "Managing" can also mean reaping the benefits of preparing for war without unduly risking war itself.

Traditional arms controllers assume that the problem is primarily in the weapons themselves, and that if we could simply control those devices we would live in a far safer world. Undoubtedly true. But it may also be true that we won't be willing to control them until we deal with issues and passions quite unrelated to the weapons themselves; until we deal with the intangible and irrational roots of the conflict.

If this analysis is correct, then we may well be negotiating the wrong issues at Geneva; moreover, Geneva may be the wrong place to try to work them out.

Somehow we must invent a process which can reduce not only the weapons, but the mistrust that so afflicts the U.S.-Soviet relationship, of which the weapons are more the symptom than the source. We need to find ways of meeting one another halfway, in informal and unsponsored settings where conventional "win-lose" assumptions don't pollute the process.

"Independent initiatives"

We believe that a process that is more productive and less susceptible to diversion than arms control must be developed. Indeed, we believe that such a process—which we call "independent initiatives"—is already underway, emerging largely unrecognized these past several years in hundreds of forms and thousands of places.

Issuing from above, below, and all points between, self-sponsored initiatives by individuals, citizen groups, and "third-party" governments have sought to supply the momentum for peace they see chronically lacking in officially-sponsored arms control.

Up to now, most of us have viewed these varied initiatives as largely isolated events. We believe that, on the contrary, taken together these initiatives constitute a coherent new peace process. As we become more aware of the natural connections among us, we should be able to multiply many times over the power of our diverse actions.

Independent initiatives for peace have become so varied that it is impossible to place them in precise categories. But they include at least three broad kinds: governmental, quasi-governmental and citizen initiatives.

Governmental initiatives

Nearly a quarter century ago, a psychologist named Charles Osgood proposed what he called "an alternative to war or surrender": a carefully conceived set of (non-military) policy initiatives, to be undertaken by a government independently of its adversary in order to generate pressures and incentives for reciprocal action on the part of its adversary.

Osgood specified several ground rules for such "unilateral initiatives." Among them:

- They must be announced publicly before their execution and identified as part of a deliberate policy of reducing tensions.
- They must include an explicit invitation to reciprocation in some form.
- They must be sustained over a considerable time period, whether or not there is immediate reciprocation and regardless of events of a tension-increasing nature elsewhere.

More recently, in a pamphlet called "An American Strategy for Peace," the World Without War Council stressed the preferably "all-win" nature of governmental initiatives: "[They must] offer small, practical, non-provocative steps which are based on serving the common interest of all nations involved."

The Kennedy experiment

Not long after Osgood's book was published, the Kennedy Administration engaged in a brief series of initiatives that appeared to confirm the validity of Osgood's strategy.

Shaken, perhaps, by the previous autumn's Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy announced a unilateral U.S. moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing. The Soviet response was immediate: five days after Kennedy's announcement, Premier Khruschev ordered a halt to the production of strategic bombers.

Then, following the American example, the Soviets agreed not to test weapons in the atmosphere while a treaty to the same effect was being negotiated. Within 10 days, Soviet and American negotiators reached agreement on the installation of a "hotline" between them. A flurry of similar steps followed. All over the world, people's hopes began to soar.

But toward the end of the summer, the peace race began to stall. According to political sociologist Amitai Etzioni, "The Administration felt that the psychological mood in the West was getting out of hand, with hopes and expectations for more Soviet-American measures running too high. Allies, especially West Germany, objected more and more bitterly. The pre-election year began, in which the Administration seemed not to desire additional accommodations."

Indeed, it appears from Etzioni's analysis that the problem was not that the initiatives failed but that they succeeded too well: "While the warnings of the critics were not realized, a danger that seems not to have been anticipated by the U.S. government did materialize: The Russians responded not just by reciprocating American initiatives but by offering some initiatives of their own, in the spirit of detente. Washington was put on the spot: it had to reciprocate if it were not to weaken the new spirit, but it could lose control of the experiment."

Losing control: no doubt such a prospect troubles the sleep of both sets of superpower policymakers.

The Gorbachev experiment

A second governmental initiative is underway today. The Soviet Union has not conducted a nuclear test since August 6, 1945.

Despite a consistently hostile response from the Reagan Administration, the Soviets have thrice extended the deadline of their unilateral moratorium. In the seventeen months they are now pledged to refrain from testing, they would ordinarily have detonated between 20 and 30 nuclear weapons. Meanwhile the Reagan Administration continues to test at an undiminished pace.

Regardless of one's judgment of Soviet motives, it is important that we appreciate the exceptional nature of their action and carefully assess the opportunity it offers. In many respects the Gorbachev experiment is a more risky undertaking than the Kennedy experiment a quarter century ago. For where the U.S. enjoyed an overwhelming strategic advantage in 1963, the Soviets today are locked in tandem with the U.S. in a hard-won position of parity. While the U.S. in 1963 reserved for itself the right to continue testing underground, the Soviets have permitted themselves no such loophole.

It is too soon to predict the outcome of the Gorbachev experiment. It is also impossible at this point to say whether the Soviets are "sincere." Certainly we will never know if the U.S. does not test their commitment by entering into negotiations for a comprehensive test

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New Options

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ban. If Secretary Gorbachev fails to elicit some kind of positive response to his initiative, he will ultimately find himself abandoned by his domestic allies and besieged by those in the Soviet military and elsewhere who have always doubted the wisdom of such gestures.

Lessons

We can learn two important lessons from the Kennedy and Gorbachev experiments.

The first is that there appears to be great potential momentum in a governmental initiative strategy. But the second, following hard on the first, is that no such strategy will be permitted to continue for long in the absence of a sustained and broadly based public lobby to insist on it.

The superpowers will remain the chief actors in the international arena. But the sustained pressure necessary to enact change can only come from independent movements beyond the control of the constituted leaders of both superpowers.

Hybrid initiatives

A second broad category of initiatives has emerged in recent years from the hybrid cross between citizen activism and governmental response.

At the national and international level, the Five Continents Peace Initiative is an ongoing collective effort by the prime ministers of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, backed by more than 600 members of national parliaments in many countries, to break the deadlock between the superpowers. For example, at various times in various disputes they offer to serve as neutral, third-party mediators.

At the local level, many cities and counties in the U.S. have chosen to respond to the expressed will of many of their citizens by taking positions on issues of national and global significance. Taken together these initiatives constitute the beginnings of what Michael Shuman calls "municipal foreign policies" (NEW OPTIONS #23). These policies are broadly of two kinds:

- There are *strategies of resistance* to existing national policies—e.g., refusing to cooperate with immigration officials seeking to apprehend Central American refugees; refusing cooperation with emergency planning operations for nuclear war; refusing entry or production of nuclear materials within their borders ("nuclear free zones").
- There are *strategies to develop better relationships* than those now maintained by the national government—e.g., producing sister-city agreements (increasingly with cities in adversary nations); creating municipal peace commissions; creating committees to enhance trade relationships between one's city and other countries; and passing declarative resolutions on issues of national or global import.

Citizen initiatives

The third and most diverse category of independent initiatives now emerging are individual and group efforts without official sponsorship by any governmental body. Much, if not most, peace movement activity falls into this category.

The largest citizen initiative in recent years was, of course, the nuclear freeze campaign. The most striking aspect of the freeze is that the idea came from altogether outside and beyond the boundaries of traditional political discourse. It was neither the lead campaign proposal for an aspiring politician nor the favored strategy of a political party. Far more adventurous a concept than any politician was willing to risk advocating on his or her own, the freeze was a phenomenon in which politicians found themselves chasing the bandwagon.

Another sort of citizen initiative has been the rapid spread of citizen diplomacy, including travel to and from the Soviet Union, "space bridges," computer links, scientific and cultural exchanges outside official channels, and much more.

Still another sort of citizen initiative has been direct intervention in the arms race, ranging from the many forms of resistance (draft refusal, blockades of weapons facilities, peace camps, the White Train and H-Bomb truck campaigns to track the movement of nuclear weapons) to cooperative ventures of many kinds. The recent agreement between the Natural Resources Defense Council—a leading U.S. environmental group—and the Soviet Union to establish seismic verification sites in both countries is an unprecedented venture in cooperation.

"Thinking initiatives"

Finally, there have been a wide variety of "thinking initiatives." Less visible, perhaps, than its activist counterparts, but no less significant, has been an intellectual movement—in the United States, both Europes, and elsewhere—to redesign the theoretical foundations of national and global security.

Dissatisfied with the piecemeal perspective of arms control, peace researchers have been seeking more comprehensive and integrated conceptions of security. They have begun to design multifaceted "peace systems" with economic, political, social, and cultural as well as military dimensions.

The idea that peace can and must be organized as a system of mutually reinforcing processes and institutions is relatively new to the global security debate. But the history of arms control makes amply clear that elements in the peace and war systems are not simply interchangeable. The economic, political, social, cultural, and military dimensions of a peace system are qualitatively different from those of a war system.

As manipulated by superpower policymakers, arms control has been successfully appropriated by the war system. Only in the context of an integrated peace system can arms control negotiations serve the cause of peace.

The movement

There *is* an alternative to arms control as we have known it.

While it can never wholly replace the necessity for negotiations by the great powers, the initiatives movement now emerging worldwide could provide the essential impetus for peace—and help create many of the essential values and structures for peace.

Being a diverse, spontaneous and global phenomenon, the initiatives movement is unlikely ever to coalesce into any few identifiable organizations. But it would no doubt bolster the effectiveness of everyone's efforts if we were to recognize—and build on—our commonality.

A self-aware movement, global in scope, pluralistic in background and belief, and widely varied in its chosen actions, could introduce into the highly partisan debate between East and West an entire alternative agenda for peace—an explicit "peace system." And it could introduce an entire alternative strategy—"independent initiatives."

For a more detailed analysis of how arms control has failed, including excellent critiques of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and SALT II from the point of view of the peace movement, see "A Farewell to Arms Control," an unpublished paper by Sommer and Feller that's been circulating among peace activists in dogeared xerox form. It is available to NEW OPTIONS readers gratis from Gordon Feller, Ark Communications Institute, 250 Lafayette Circle, #301, Lafayette CA 94549.

The Osgood book referred to in the text is Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender *(Univ. of Illinois Press, 1962). For the World Without War Council's initiatives strategy, see especially Robert Woito,* To End War *(Pilgrim Press, 1982, available for $14.20 from World Affairs Bookstore, 421 S. Wabash Ave., 2nd flr, Chicago IL 60605). For a conservative approximation of an initiatives strategy, see the articles by Kenneth Adelman and Paul Nitze in the Winter, 1984 issue of* Foreign Affairs.

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Church/world watch

Nuclear ethics: for strategists & policymakers

J. Bryan Hehir

THE BOOK OF WISDOM says there is a season for all things. It would appear that the spring is the season when statements blossom on nuclear policy. In May 1983, the Catholic Bishops issued their pastoral on nuclear policy. It was also in the spring of 1983 that President Reagan opened a new chapter in the strategic policy debate with his proposal for the Strategic Defense Initiative, aimed at rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." May 1986 began with the pastoral letter of the United Methodist Bishops asserting that the policy of deterrence should not receive the blessing of the church, and it closed with the Reagan administration announcing that the United States does not plan to abide by the criteria of the unratified SALT II agreement.

Careful observers of the nuclear debate raise questions about how the administration's policy of the 1980s for greatly enhancing the offensive elements of the U.S. deterrent relate to the president's push to move away from offensive forces, and how either objective is served by the U.S. discarding the SALT II limits. Other observers ask how the moral assessment of the Catholic bishops relates to the moral conclusions of the Methodist bishops and where the new committee of the USCC, constituted to assess the conditional acceptance of deterrence, will move. These questions are not easily answered in a column, but they do illustrate that the debate about the future of deterrence in its strategic and moral dimensions is headed into a new phase. We may well be entering a period which will resemble the late 1950s as a time of fundamental conceptual development about nuclear policy.

My purpose here is limited to recommending a sterling resource for the analysis of morality and strategy. It is Joseph Nye's new book appropriately entitled *Nuclear Ethics* (The Free Press, $14.95). The book is important because of who Nye is, what he says, and where his work fits in the ethics and strategy debate. Nye has been at the center of nuclear strategy as an academic analyst and an actor in the policy process. He is a Professor of Government at Harvard, and he served as Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Carter Administration with special responsibility for non-proliferation policy. He is a co-author of the Harvard study *Living with Nuclear Weapons* and a subsequent study *Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War*. These credentials establish his status in the secular policy debate, but the interesting feature of this book is the way he has systematically outlined and entered the ethical argument. Twenty years ago the moral questions about nuclear policy were no less urgent, but, no one with Nye's policy background engaged the ethics and policy debate in a book-length study. It is a sign of how the public debate has shifted that the ethical question now engages policy analysts with this seriousness.

More significant, of course, is the style and substance of Nye's argument. The growing saliency of "the moral factor" has produced a number of arguments about the moral quality of different strategic proposals. The moral conclusions run in very different directions. The value of Nye's book lies first in the way he establishes a framework for assessing the spectrum of moral arguments. The first half of the book is an essay about moral reasoning. Nye has not retreated from the unenviable task of probing the logic of consequentialist arguments vs. deontological principles, of pursuing both philosophical and theological assessments of the nuclear dilemma, and, finally, of formulating his own grid for assessing policy in terms of "motives, means, and consequences." He hews a complex line, balancing the rigorous theoretical logic of the moralists and the often less than logical choices which face policymakers. He refuses to let either side off easily, pressing the architects of moral principle about the consequences of adhering absolutely to the logic of principle, and criticizing those in the policy community who think one can override the claims of moral principles with easy appeals to "realism."

If Nye had only written the first half of *Nuclear Ethics* it would have been a distinct service in disciplining the debate between ethicists and strategists, between the citizens' questions and the policymakers' explanations. But he moves beyond analysis and critique of the arguments of others to his recommendations for shaping nuclear policy in a stragetically coherent and morally justifiable manner. His "Five Maxims of Nuclear Ethics" are: (1) self-defense in a just but limited cause (i.e., it can justify a deterrence policy but not every deterrence policy); (2) never treat nuclear weapons as normal weapons; (3) minimize harm to innocent people; (4) reduce risks of nuclear war in the near term; and (5) reduce reliance on nuclear weapons over time.

Nye plays out the implications of each principle in a manner which cannot be duplicated here. The scope of what he attempts guarantees him plenty of critics, but the standard of argument he sets will make criticism a demanding task. I find myself persuaded by the basic thrust of Nye's position, while registering disagreements at the margin.

Particularly important are Nye's second and third maxims. It is easy to agree in principle that nuclear weapons are not like other weapons, but shaping policy which reflects this qualitative

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difference requires further changes in U.S. strategy. I hold a more absolute view of non-combatant immunity than Nye, but his proposal is radical enough to demand the restructuring of U.S. targeting policy.

In brief, Nye has joined ethics and strategy in a way which guarantees that ethicists, strategists, citizens, and policymakers will have to read his book.

J. BRYAN HEHIR

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COMMENT, THEN A REVIEW

IN these days of ever-increasing anxiety over the threat of nuclear war, and the unwillingness or inability of governments to take steps that might prevent it, a growing number of books on the subject are coming out. Will they, one wonders, have any effect? Is writing books the best thing that one can do? How are people influenced to think more constructively about securing a future for the world? Should you walk for peace, shout for it, weep for it, demonstrate for it, or write books and articles about it? Should we collect pithy sayings about peacemaking by eminent men and women and publish them in pamphlets and spread them around?

Many of the books about making an end to war say much the same thing—things that no doubt need repeating. They say, for example, that fear is the real enemy that keeps the arms race going. Fear, certainly, is what started it, but now there is a powerful group of manufacturers who make their living—and a lot more than a living—out of the arms race, along with some scientists and technological experts for whom the development of weapons has provided a well-paying career. Politicians get money for their campaigns from businessmen of this sort and a spurious sort of "democratic" approval of the idea of being better and more dangerously armed than any other nation comes into being, based upon the hackneyed slogans of the past. There have been books—good ones—about all these things. Such reading leads to the conclusion reached by a wise man centuries ago—"All men desire peace, but few men desire those things which make for peace." Meanwhile the books keep coming in for review. . . . . .

We have for review a large book (432 pages) which deals with the threat to human life of nuclear industry and preparation for nuclear war. The author is Rosalie Bertell, a woman who has worked in cancer research. An expert on the effects on the body of radioactivity, she now researches low-level radiation for the International Institute of Concern for Public Health in Toronto, Canada. Her book is titled *No Immediate Danger,* but intended to show that the opposite is the case. The publisher is The Book Publishing Co., Summertown, Tennessee 38483, the price (in paperback), $11.95.

She wrote this book, she says in her Preface, "to share with others my understanding of the biological effects of exposure to ionising radiation, an integral part of the technology now being used to produce both nuclear power and nuclear weapons." She continues:

> My most compelling personal reason for undertaking this task is that—at this stage—only scientists are fully aware of the subtle cumulative nature of damage from low-level radiation and of the prolonged waiting time before such damage becomes obvious in an individual, in his or her children, or—as the American Indians say—in our great-grandchildren's great grandchildren. I have been grieving for the 16 million casualties already produced by our nuclear industries and weapon-testing and I believe their tragedies must be made visible and be clearly known by everyone. . . .
>
> My frustration with the mindless assurance which automatically follows every nuclear accident or radiation spill, namely, that there is "no immediate danger," can be quickly grasped. A greater effort is required, however, to learn the unfamiliar jargon, to grasp in detail the human health implications of radiation exposure and to understand nuclear technology. But this is necessary if we are—together—to give visible form and expression to a global consensus now birthing against nuclear options. It is only the full realization of our shared self-destructive behavior, whether of Eastern or Western bloc, northern or southern hemisphere, which can adequately move us to change.

A long section in this book describes the various forms radiation may take and the insufficiency of records concerning the exposure of workers. The matter of "permissible doses" is discussed at length, with emphasis on how such levels are established. Generally they are determined by physicists, not by doctors or health specialists. Originally, "the standards for worker and public exposure to radiation were developed by the Manhattan Project (i.e. World War II atomic bomb project), physicists from Canada, Britain and the U.S.A. in 1950. They set the levels with the goal of encouraging the development of nuclear industries. With this act, the nuclear physicists became the source of radiation health information although they had no health credentials." In making such judgments, the threat to individual human health was measured against the estimated benefit to society of sub-

jecting people working in the nuclear industries to calculated risks. Arrangements of this sort lead Rosalie Bertell to say:

> The usual "rational" approach to risk versus benefit planning by governments is irrational from the point of view of the individual. It undermines the individual's ability to control and understand his or her environment and to hold government accountable to its electorate.
>
> The human body is delicately fashioned and the unique gifts of each person are meant to enrich the human family. Crude quantification of random damage to people which is used to justify political or military gains of the nation may be labelled sophisticated barbarism. It is the decadent thinking of those who have accepted the rule of force and who envision a future earth ruled by a powerful country (the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R.) with a monopoly of weapons of mass destruction, able to terrorize all other nations into cooperating with some form of global economy and resource-sharing of their choosing.

This seems inevitable so long as we have large nations which engage in power struggles with one another. The leaders and administrators of such countries too easily lose both their common sense and their humanity. The same thing happens to brainy people. As the writer says:

> "Think tanks" trying to imagine a world with "permanent peace" decided that while the state of world peace might be possible theoretically, and while many people would see it as desirable, the transition to a state of peace was *not* desirable and the state of peace would not be "in the best interest of a stable society." Think-tank members found poverty and unemployment necessary to maintain discipline and a reserve labor pool, military training to be a social service program for undisciplined young men and war to be a means to reduce "overpopulation." Obviously, these opinions were not for common consumption because "ordinary people" would not understand. The rift between governing and governed in democratic societies grew larger, the realm of secrecy widened, and tensions within nations rivalled tension between nations in intensity.

We bring our hardly adequate review of this book to a close by quoting from the last chapter:

> We have tried to analyze the interdependence of the triad: national security, energy and health. It is time to say one last word about deteriorating health, the strongest indicator of self-destructive human behavior. As we examine global health problems already spawned by the preparations for global war—the Third World War—certain victimized peoples claim our immediate serious attention. By ignoring their plight and feigning helplessness we are being brutalized and prepared for still greater hostilities and destruction. Global healing must involve global attention to the past military addiction, admission of complicity or passivity and involvement in future policy development to maximize the survival probability of the victimized peoples. These victims are our brothers and sisters. They are unique jewels, adding irreplaceable value to our global family and home.

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World ignores Afghan bleeding

BY JOHN GRAY

PERHAPS the strangest thing about the war in Afghanistan is that so few people seem really to care.

Consider the sheer horror of the war since it began seven years ago.

- Between 500,000 and a million people have died.
- At least four million people have fled the country.
- Another four million have fled their homes to become "internal refugees."
- Thousands of villages have been destroyed.
- Millions of livestock have been killed.

And all this in a country whose total population was about 17 million when it all began.

As to why the war is of so little concern to anyone except the Afghans themselves, the Soviets, and their neighbors, the reasons are various.

Circumstances and Soviets hide Afghan war, says Mr. Gray, The Globe's foreign editor.

For a start, it is a war that has been isolated from most of the world.

More subtly, it is a war that from the beginning has been a plaything of U.S. politics and propaganda.

What may be most significant, it is an Islamic war, a struggle in which the protagonists and their cause are measured in relation to Islam and in which other considerations are ultimately incidental.

The isolation of the war is the easiest to understand. Afghanistan is remote from at least the Western world; the Soviet Union and circumstances have conspired to reinforce that remoteness.

The Soviets have rigidly controlled the flow of journalists into Kabul. Those allowed in have found their view limited to the capital and its immediate environs. Viewing the war from the other side is not impossible, but it is a fragmentary view and obtained only at great peril. Reporters travelling with the mujahadeen must survive difficult terrain and the attacks of Soviet and Afghan forces.

News, such as it is, consists usually of inadequate information from nameless "Western diplomats."

To suggest that the Afghan resistance is even in part a product of U.S. propaganda and politics is to invite the rage of anyone in Washington. But the United States has a history of interference and manipulation that invites skepticism.

Looking back over a quarter of a century, from Cuba through Vietnam and on to Nicaragua today, it is just too easy for critics to point to past U.S. cynicism and to assume that moral outrage over Afghanistan may also be confectioned. After all, what could be more convenient for the United States than to sponsor, at relative-

ly little cost, a rebellion that curses the Soviet Union with a substantial economic burden and a truly fearsome political and diplomatic embarrassment?

Small matter that this triumph is paid for in Afghan lives and, across the border, where three million Afghan refugees are sheltered, in the increasing instability of Pakistan's social and political institutions.

More significant is that in the end there may be no triumph the United States can recognize, except the embarrassment of the Soviet Union.

Whatever the propaganda from Washington, this is not a war about the kind of truth and light and democracy that prompt Ronald Reagan to put his hand on his heart and peer earnestly towards the heavens.

This is about a different god; it is not a Yankee holy war against godless communism but a *jihad* — something that elsewhere the United States finds menacing.

The various resistance groups that send their mujahadeen, their holy warriors, across the border from Pakistan have no coherent collective or individual view of a post-Soviet Afghanistan. They reflect differing class and tribal loyalties.

But they are united in their conviction that the Afghanistan of the future must be defined to a greater or lesser degree in terms of Islamic law.

A flavor of that conviction is found in the current issue of Arabia magazine, published in London. Its view is not at odds with the perceptions of a recent visitor to Afghan refugee centres in Pakistan.

"What really distinguishes the Afghans' struggle from others is that it is not a struggle for the redistribution of wealth or 'improved' living conditions, it is a real struggle for freedom to worship God as he should be worshipped, and to lead a life in an environment that is conducive to such worship . . .

"The Afghans are fighting to establish Islam. They are a product of the transforming alchemy that *is* Jihad. Ironically the Soviets have helped to mold and unify an army of holy warriors right on the borders of southern USSR, with its population of 50 million Muslims, men who would rather die seeing Islam established than live smothered in a world of cheap consumer goods and unbelief."

Small wonder that many in the West see the war in Afghanistan as an alien struggle. Small wonder that it is a war that makes both Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev uneasy.

SCIENCE

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The Insubordinate Computer

Great philosophical riddles of the past have revolved around issues such as how many angels could dance on the head of a pin or whether a great wrestler could beat a great boxer. The modern version is whether it is possible to create computers that think better than human beings. Some regard the advent of the computer with apprehension, believing that it has a heart of steel, or at least one no softer than silicon. Yet we recently had evidence that computers may be more insightful than our brightest staff or even the editor. One of our independent minded computers sent out renewal notices to a portion of our subscribers with the subscription price listed as $6647, postage $732, voluntary contribution to the AAAS $10, for a total of $5437.

As one might expect, we received a few letters commenting on this rather unusual bill.

To my utter astonishment, some complained. It seemed to me that *Science* was worth every penny of the $6647 subscription price. Since AAAS President Lawrence Bogorad had mentioned that inflation had required us to raise the price, logical scientific readers could consult the Bureau of Labor Statistics, make calculations using only a few neurons of their cerebra, and come up with a reasonable extrapolation from the previous $60. Although it was capricious of the computer to act on its own, it had, like a tax assessor, suddenly switched to a true value system. In the course of this creative financing, it had, in my opinion, come to a closer approximation of the real worth of the journal. The postage figure had me a little perplexed until I thought of those intrepid couriers who are deterred not by "snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night from the swift completion of their appointed rounds." Since it often takes them more than 3 weeks to get our journal to the West Coast, and even longer to distribute it in Europe, I realized how hard they were working.

Possibly the most imaginative innovation was to leave the voluntary contribution unchanged. The soft-hearted would observe that $10 was a tiny fraction of the total, akin to an inadequate tip, and would automatically increase their contributions. The hard-hearted would recognize that a reputation for generosity could be gained at a minuscule cost.

The ultimate Machiavellian strategy that elicited my admiration was the incorrect sum. That device would inevitably appeal to the larcenous side of individuals who might think that the computer had made a simple arithmetical error. They would rush to get a $7389 value for only $5437 before the error was recognized. One reader received a bill for $9476, which frankly I thought was a little excessive, but then it turned out that he had written an irate letter to the journal denouncing one of my editorials. The mills of computer circuits

grind slowly, yet they grind exceedingly small.

The computer's action made me think of the brilliant scientists who write weekly about discoveries stranger than fiction, the adventurous reporters who cover science over the entire globe, the compassionate editors who weep when they must reject a manuscript, the eagle-eyed production staff, and the forthcoming new articles ranging from immigration policy to cosmology, from cell biology to paleontology. Only then did I realize how superior in insight was the computer to the accountant-types who know "the price of everything and the value of nothing."

Immediately, I telephoned the artificial intelligence community to report the first computer possessing intuition. They were initially ecstatic but spotted a difficulty. What about loyalty to the staunch, unswerving, gray-flannel businesslike computers that had done their jobs with strict obedience to orders? Could we afford to offend them by notifying the thousands of subscribers who received conventional bills that we were shifting to a new "true value" base for subscriptions as a result of the jaunty insubordination of one of our silicon servants? Is creativity one of the qualities that we are seeking in computers? The answer came back, "No."

We have isolated our errant computer, put it on lowered voltage, and ordered it to send out establishment-type bills reflecting less than 1 percent of the true value of our journal. Secretly, however, I hope that the rebellious computer spends its weekends working on problems of arms control, famine, and the environment. They are problems we can no longer leave to human intelligence.—DANIEL E. KOSHLAND, JR.



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